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Do we harm others even if we don’t
need to?
M. Paula Cacault, Lorenz Goette, Rafael Lalive * and Mathias Thoenig
Department of Economics, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland
Evolutionary explanations of the co-existence of large-scale cooperation and warfare
in human societies rest on the hypothesis of parochial altruism, the view that in-group
pro-sociality and out-group anti-sociality have co-evolved. We designed an experiment
that allows subjects to freely choose between actions that are purely pro-social, purely
anti-social, or a combination of the two. We present behavioral evidence on the existence
of strong aggression—a pattern of non-strategic behaviors that are welfare-reducing for
all individuals (i.e., victims and perpetrators). We also show how strong aggression serves
to dynamically stabilize in-group pro-sociality.
Keywords: parochial altruism, experimental tests, public-good, in-group favoritism, out-group aggression, strong
aggression
1. Introduction
“...Ich bin ein Teil von jener Kraft, die stets das Böse will, und stets das Gute schafft” (Faust, 1335–1336).
[I am part of that power which eternally wills evil and eternally works good].
Human societies are unique in the animal world. They are characterized by extensive cooperation in
large groups of genetically unrelated individuals (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Boyd and Richerson,
2006). But they are also ravaged by intergroup cleavages and conflicts with huge death toll arising
due to genocides, ethnic cleansing, terrorism, and wars in modern societies (Doyle and Sambanis,
2006; Blattman andMiguel, 2010). Ethnographic research suggests that warfare was a leading cause
of death and presumably an important driver of the evolution of Homo Sapiens in foraging societies
(Chagnon, 1988; Keeley, 1996; Bowles, 2006; Gat, 2006). This dual aspect of human social behavior
has been an enduring puzzle in evolutionary biology (Darwin, 1871; Hamilton, 1975), in social
sciences (Baron, 2001; Posner, 2004; Sambanis et al., 2012) and in humanities as illustrated by
our quote from Mephistopheles’ famous statement to Faust (von Goethe, 1808). A prominent
evolutionary explanation of this joint phenomenon rests on the hypothesis of parochial altruism
(Wilson, 1975; Avilés, 2002; Boyd et al., 2003; Franck, 2003; Bowles, 2009). Though a catch-all term,
we define parochial altruism as the set of behaviors and heuristics combining strong forms of in-
group pro-sociality and out-group anti-sociality that translate into actions where individuals, at
personal cost, help members of their in-group while also hurting others in the out-group. Thus,
violence and atrocities are often perpetrated in the name of group interests and history abounds
with tales of self-sacrifice in war. For instance, Arnold vonWinkelried, a Swiss soldier, is reputed to
have helped the Swiss to victory over the army of the Habsburg regime in the battle of Sempach in
1386. He saved the battle by throwing himself into the Austrian attack formation, grabbing as many
spears as he could and having them impale him. He fell dead but his action opened a hole in the
attack formation and helped his compatriots to rush to victory. Winkelried personifies an extreme
combination of in-group cooperation and inter-group hostility.
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In this paper, we design incentivized experiments to test the
key set of phenotypic predictions at the core of the theory
of parochial altruism. We first test for the existence of strong
aggression: a pattern of antisocial behaviors which are designed
to reduce the welfare of the out-group, do not improve welfare
for the in-group compared to other peaceful behaviors, and are
not motivated by cross-group strategic concerns (e.g., retaliation
or preventive strike). Secondly, we ask whether the presence
of aggression increases cooperation with the in-group. Theories
of parochial altruism (Choi and Bowles, 2007; Lehmann and
Feldman, 2008; Lehmann, 2011) suggest that we should observe
the aggressive trait not in isolation but rather systematically
associated to its in-group pro-social counterpart. We are able to
identify this relationship because our experimental design allows
participants to either be cooperative with their in-group, hurt
the out-group, or cooperate with their in-group and hurt the
out-group at the same time. Thirdly, the parochial theory claims
that, in human evolutionary history, the stabilization of in-group
pro-sociality has been ensured by the simultaneous emergence
of out-group aggression. We study the dynamics of in-group
cooperation in a repeated interaction setup and assess whether
the mere existence of anti-social actions dynamically stabilizes
in-group cooperation, even when repeated-game incentives
vanish.
Research on parochial altruism has focused on the theoretical
channels through which selective pressures have calibrated
human brain and cognition—i.e., genetic evolution in small
groups of hunter-gatherers or cultural evolution in large groups
with norm enforcement and social punishment (Henrich et al.,
2006, 2010; Choi and Bowles, 2007; Lehmann and Feldman,
2008; Bell et al., 2009; Lehmann, 2011; Mathew and Boyd,
2011). However, phenotypic evidence on parochial altruism is
scant. Some studies show that anti-social motivations are quite
common in many societies and organizations (Abbink et al.,
2010; Goette et al., 2012). Several behavioral investigations
document the in-group bias of pro-sociality and its moderation
by group salience (Goette et al., 2006; Efferson et al., 2008;
Yamagishi and Mifune, 2009; Abbink et al., 2010; Alexander
and Fotini, 2011). These papers look at how cooperation is
affected by in-group vs out-group membership and test for
the presence of “in-group love” and “out-group hate” using
manipulations of group membership (e.g., minimal groups or
private/public knowledge about group membership). Our study
complements the literature by providing evidence for strong
aggression. Strong aggression differs from out-group hate that
is defined as a “reduced level of cooperation with out-group
members” (Yamagishi and Mifune, 2009, p. 230). In our design
group-salience is not manipulated and out-group hate is muted
as subjects are not allowed to cooperate with their out-group in
any way.
Existing evidence in the literature is consistent with parochial
altruism but it discusses only partial and indirect manifestations
of parochialism. The crucial aspect of parochial altruism is the
complementarity between in-group pro-sociality and out-group
anti-sociality. With this respect, our study differs in important
ways from earlier work on aggression in the laboratory. In
our design participants can reach any given level of in-group
cooperation without exerting out-group aggressive behaviors1.
The strategic proximate motives to display out-group aggression
are thereby muted and aggression is not a necessary precondition
for achieving in-group cooperation as in earlier work (Bornstein
and Ben-Yossef, 1994; Tan and Bolle, 2007). Moreover, in our
design, strong aggression is elicited in an asymmetric way
such that there is no overlap between perpetrating groups
and victimized groups. This feature is the key difference with
the intergroup prisoner’s dilemma-maximizing differences game
(IPD-MD, Halevy et al. 2008; De Dreu et al. 2010). In particular,
an important result by Halevy et al. (2008) is that participants to
the IPD-MD do not exhibit strong aggression and exert peaceful
cooperation when they are allowed to. We hypothesize that
this pattern is due to the symmetric design of the IPD-MD
that presumably promotes peaceful behaviors: Expectations of
retaliation by the other group could potentially inhibit aggressive
behaviors. By contrast, those expectations play no role in our
asymmetric version of the IPD-MD and our results clearly show
that participants exhibit patterns of strong aggression in this
asymmetric setup. Zizzo (2004) discusses an experiment where,
by paying a price, subjects could then eliminate (burn) and
redistribute money (including their own) and, in about half of the
sessions, steal money from others. He finds that about 20% of the
subjects “burn” money and stealing also occurs quite frequently.
There is a key difference between this experiment and ours: while
burning money reduces inequality in Zizzo (2004)’s setting, the
corresponding options in our design increased inequality.
2. Materials and Methods
We implement the test for parochial altruism in the context
of a linear Public Good laboratory experiment. Participants
were recruited from a subject pool composed mainly of
undergraduate students at the University of Lausanne (UNIL)
and at the Federal Polytechnic School of Lausanne. Invitations
were sent to a random subset of the subject pool; we excluded
psychology students because they may have been participating
in experiments that involve deception. None of the conditions
implemented in this experiment involved deception and the
experimental procedure was approved by the Ethics’ Committee
of the Faculty of Business and Economics (HEC) of the UNIL. All
experiments were anonymous, computer-mediated (Fischbacher,
2007), with a strict enforcement of non-communication between
participants, and the instructions were phrased in a neutral way
(with no reference to aggression, competition, victimization, etc.
C.f. Section 2 of the Supplementary Material for a translation of
the instructions). Upon arrival at the meeting point, participants
signed a consent form in line with the aforementioned ethics’
committee guidelines.
We organized 8 sessions gathering 18 participants each,
who were randomly assigned to a three-person group (their
in-group). Each group was exposed to one, and only one,
1This is important because (Brewer, 2001) argues that “the relationship between in-
group identification and out-group hostility is progressive and contingent rather
than necessary or inevitable.” Indeed, Duckitt and Mphuthing (1998) show that
out-group hostility is contingent on historical experience in the South African
context.
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of the three following conditions (see Table 1): The control
condition is a standard linear public good game; aggression
is a treatment condition and corresponds to a variant of
the public good game where members of this group can
perpetrate aggression against a victimized group; victimization
is a treatment condition where group members are engaged
into a standard linear public good game and simultaneously are
victimized by another group. Groups were randomly assigned to
the control, aggression or victimization condition and there was
no strategic interaction between these groups whatsoever. Group
membership was reinforced by a minimal-group manipulation
with shirts of different colors, depending on the condition
(Control: orange, Aggression: green, Victimization: blue). We
neither manipulate the emotional state of individuals, nor do we
induce inter-group hostility, nor do we manipulate information
on group membership. Our key manipulation concerns the
actions individuals can take and the effects of their actions for
others.
In the control condition, members of each group received
an individual endowment of 30 monetary units (MUs) that they
were entitled to keep or to allocate partially/totally to an in-group
TABLE 1 | Summary of the options available to participants in the different
conditions.
Condition Control Victimization Aggression
Available options Keep Keep Keep
Project A Project A Project A
Project B
Project C
DESCRIPTION OF THE OPTIONS
Keep: 1 MU invested in this option yields 1 MU to the individual, i.e.,
players keep the MUs in their individual account.
Project A: 1 MU invested yields 2 MU that are distributed equally among
the three group members. The extra MU comes from the
Experimenter.
Project B: 1 MU invested yields 2 MU that are distributed equally among
the three group members. The extra MU comes from the
Victimized group.
Project C: 1 MU invested yields 0 MU. 1 MU is deducted from the
Victimized group.
pool called “Project A.” Every MU contributed to this in-group
pool is doubled (by the experimenter) and shared equally among
the three in-groupmembers. The game was played for six periods
with the same group composition. After each period, participants
stated their beliefs about the contribution to non-selfish option
A of the other individuals in their in-group. Since the group
composition was stable, there was the scope for cooperation early
in the game due to incentives stemming from finite repetition.
In this condition, we expect the standard pattern of initial
cooperation to steadily decline over periods as players approach
the final period of the public good game (end-game effect).
In the aggression condition, participants could also keep or
partially/totally allocate their endowment to Project A, but two
additional options were made available to them. The first option
is an in-group pool called “Project B” where every MU is doubled
and shared equally among the in-group members. In contrast to
project A, the extra MU in project B comes from the victimized
group reducing its payoff by one MU. The second option is
“Project C,” where every MU contributed to that option is lost
to members of the in-group and it reduces the payoff of the
victimized group by one MU. The game was played for six
periods. After each period, participants saw the total number
of MUs invested in projects A, B, and C and by how much
the payoff of the victimized group was reduced as a result of
contributions to B and C. Subjects then stated their beliefs about
the average contribution to non-selfish options A, B, and C of
the other individuals in their in-group. Notice that contributions
to projects A and B generate identical payoffs for the in-group.
The key difference is that project B entails aggression toward
the out-group whereas project A is neutral to the out-group.
Contributions to project B and C are consistent with strong
aggression, as they reduce out-group welfare, do not improve in-
group welfare compared to project A, and can not be motivated
by retaliation.
In the victimization condition, members of the group play the
standard public good game. In contrast to the control condition,
payoffs received by the victimization participants are reduced
in a way defined by decisions of the assigned perpetrating
group. Importantly these reductions are independent of decisions
of members of the victimized group. Consequently, in-group
cooperation does not allow victimized group members to shield
against external aggression.
Notice that in all three conditions contributions are affected by
the standard social dilemma: not contributing yields the highest
individual payoff regardless of what others do.
At the end of each session, participants completed an open-
answer survey with questions on why they chose to contribute to
the projects available to them. We make use of this information
on motivational aspects in order to complement the behavioral
evidence on strong aggression.
3. Results
Our first result is that antisocial projects B and C are used
throughout the game in the aggression condition (see Figure 1).
Participants contribute around 9 out of 30 MUs to the purely
cooperative project A, around 5 MUs to the anti-social project B,
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and about 1 MU to the anti-social project C. Anti-social projects
(B and C) make up 30–40% of total non-selfish contributions
(projects A, B, and C) and this amount is statistically significant
(one-sample mean-comparison test t = 12.87, p < 0.01).
Contributions to the purely anti-social project C are positive
(one-sample mean-comparison test t = 6.16, p < 0.01), but
significantly lower than contributions to project B, which is both
anti-social to the out-group and pro-social to the in-group (two-
sample mean-comparison test t = 9.11, p < 0.01, c.f. Figure 1).
This evidence suggests that purely aggressive behavior is rare,
but it becomes much more prevalent if it can be combined with
in-group pro-sociality.
Participants who invest into projects B and C display
behaviors consistent with strong aggression. However, there are
two alternative motivational drivers that we would like to discuss:
Firstly, participants could contribute to B rather than A because
they are indifferent to the consequences on the victimized
group; secondly, participants who contribute to C could have
been merely confused and chosen this option by mistake. We
investigate this issue by analyzing answers to the survey on why
participants in the aggression condition contributed to projects
A, B, and C. Table 2 displays the list of motives for each project,
by order of frequency (see Section 3 of the Supplementary
Material for details about this classification and examples of
participants’ statements). Results show that participants who
contributed to A did so to increase earnings of the group (15
out of 44) or increase earnings of the group without harming
the other group (13 out of 44 subjects). This evidence suggests
that most subjects in the lab were not indifferent to the payoffs of
their own group and that a sizable proportion was also sensitive
to the earnings of the victimized group. Similarly, the modal
motive for contributing to B was to “harm the other group while
FIGURE 1 | This figure shows the average number of monetary units
(MUs) contributed to project A, project B, and project C (mean ± 1
standard error) among the individuals in the aggression condition (see
Table 1 for description of the projects). Contributions to project A are
significantly higher than contributions to project B (two-sample
mean-comparison test (paired) t = 4.78, p < 0.01) but individuals also
contribute to anti-social projects B and C—options that reduce the payoffs to
individuals in the victimized group.
benefiting my own group” (12 out of 33) while others wanted
“to harm the other group” (5 out of 33). Hence, more than
half of all subjects who contributed to project B claimed to do
so in order to reduce the payoffs of others. Were participants
who chose option C merely confused about this option? Results
show that most participants who contributed to C did so “to
harm the other group” (11 out of 18). When we study detailed
information on who chose C, we find that of the participants who
choose C, most chose it two times or more. Most participants
who chose option C apparently did not do so by mistake or out
of confusion. Clearly, the motivational evidence indicates that a
sizable proportion of participants who contribute to projects B
and C were fully aware of the negative consequences for the out-
group, and claimed to do so specifically because of those negative
consequences. Both their motives and behavior are consistent
with “strong aggression.”
Notice that contributions to project B might also be higher
than contributions to C because B is a more effective aggression
technology than C: Reducing the out-group’s payoff by one MU
costs 1 MU with C but only 1/3 of a MU with B. While we
cannot rule out that some subjects chose B simply because it
is a better punishment technology, we exploit again the survey
TABLE 2 | Motives to invest in available projects of participants in the
agression condition.
Motive Participants
PROJECT A
To increase earnings of my group 15
To increase earnings of my group w/o harming other group 13
It is the safest or most profitable project 11
Not invested 4
Unclear motive 3
Others in my group had invested 2
All 48
PROJECT B
Not invested 15
To harm the other group while benefiting my group 12
It is the safest or most profitable project 6
To harm the other group 5
Unclear motive 5
Indifference with project A 3
Was testing 1
Others in my group had invested 1
All 48
PROJECT C
Not invested 30
To harm the other group 11
Was testing 3
Unclear motive 2
To harm the other group w/o benefiting my group 1
Others in my group had invested 1
All 48
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on motivational aspects to show that this feature of our design
is unlikely to drive the main results. As displayed in Table 2
only a small share of participants (5 out of 33) use B because
it can “harm the other group.” By contrast a sizable proportion
of subjects (12 out of 33) who contributed to B claimed to do
so because it entailed a benefit for their “in group” and a cost
to the “out-group,” consistent with an interpretation of parochial
behavior.
The second result is that non-selfish contributions increase
if out-group aggression can be exerted. Figure 2 shows that
contributions to non-selfish options (i.e., projects A, B, and C) are
larger in the aggression condition than in the control condition
(t = 1.91, p = 0.065, see Table 3, col. 2). The aggressive
options partially crowd out project A. But in net, there is a 21%
increase in non-selfish contributions. Importantly, the difference
is even more pronounced at later periods of the experiment, as
column (4) of Table 3 shows. The period-trend of contributions
to non-selfish options is significantly bigger in the aggression
condition than in the control condition (t = 2.73, p = 0.01).
Repeated interactions create a strategic motive to contribute to
the public good in early rounds of the game but this motive is
less important in the last periods of the game. Indeed, there is a
strong decrease in contributions to the public good in the control
condition (see Section 1 and Table S1 in the Supplementary
Material for additional support). This breakdown of in-group
cooperation in the control condition is a well-known dynamic
pattern in repeated public good games (Isaac and Walker, 1988;
Ledyard, 1995; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003). We interpret this
dynamic pattern as a support to the evolutionary theories of
TABLE 3 | Aggression and non-selfish behavior.
Dependent variable: contributions to projects A, B, and C
OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Aggressor 2.906 2.906 −2.004
(1.878) (1.520)* (2.339)
Aggressor × Period 1.403
(0.514)**
Period −1.885
(0.420)***
Constant 13.295 13.580 18.103
(1.378)*** (2.801)*** (3.146)***
Observations 576 576 576
R2 0.017 0.136 0.143
Session dummies No Yes Yes
Period dummies No Yes No
Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Aggressor=1 if participant in Aggression condition, =0 if Control condition.
FIGURE 2 | This figure shows the number of monetary units (MUs)
contributed to non-selfish projects (mean ± 1 standard error).
Contributions to non-selfish projects are contributions to project A for
individuals in the control condition, and contributions to projects A, B, and C
for individuals in the aggression condition. The figure shows contributions
over all six periods in (A), over the first three out of six periods in (B), and
contributions over the last three out of six periods in (C). Over all periods, the
possibility to perpetrate aggression increases non-selfish behavior (t = 1.91,
0.05 < p < 0.1, c.f., Table 3 col. 2). The possibility to perpetrate aggression
does not increase non-selfish behavior in the early periods (t = 0.86,
p > 0.10, c.f., Table S1 col. 3), but it does so in the last three periods
(t = 2.60, 0.01 < p < 0.05, c.f., Table S1 col. 4).
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parochial altruism (i.e., co-evolution of in-group cooperation and
out-group aggression).
Can unpacking effects due to the larger number of options
in the aggression condition explain our results? Participants
who play a public goods game with two identical public goods
options tend to contribute much more in early rounds, but they
learn over time that unpacked options are identical and their
contributions converge to the level observed in the standard
game in later rounds (Bernasconi et al., 2009). Our results are
different. Contributions to projects A, B, and C in the aggression
condition are similar to contributions to project A in the control
condition in initial rounds. The difference in contributions
becomes only salient toward later periods of the game. Thus, the
pattern of our empirical findings is not consistent with unpacking
effects. What is more, we carefully explained to participants that
option A had no implications for other participants whereas
option B did, and participants answered a series of control
questions that specifically addressed this issue before making
decisions (c.f. instructions in Section 2 of the Supplementary
Material).
Results are similar when we focus more specifically on in-
group cooperation (i.e., projects A and B only). Figure 3 shows
a positive impact of the possibility to perpetrate aggression on in-
group cooperation, though the effect is not statistically significant
over all periods (seeTable 4, col. 2). The difference in cooperation
between aggression and control is, however, magnified in the
later periods of the game as the period-trend is significantly
higher in the aggression condition than in the control (t = 2.56,
p = 0.015, see Table 4, col. 3. C.f. Table S2 in the Supplementary
Material). This result reflects the fact that in-group cooperation
TABLE 4 | Aggression and cooperative behavior.
Dependent variable: contributions to projects A and B OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3)
Aggressor 1.677 1.677 −3.158
(1.780) (1.509) (2.375)
Aggressor × Period 1.382
(0.539)**
Period −1.885
(0.420)***
Constant 13.295 13.476 17.884
(1.378)*** (2.806)*** (3.167)***
Observations 576 576 576
R2 0.006 0.110 0.116
Session dummies No Yes Yes
Period dummies No Yes No
Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Aggressor=1 if participant in Aggression condition, =0 if Control condition.
FIGURE 3 | This figure shows the number of monetary units (MUs)
contributed to cooperative projects, i.e., projects that help the
in-group (mean ± 1 standard error). Cooperative contributions are
contributions to project A for individuals in the control and victimization
conditions, and contributions to projects A and B for individuals in the
aggression condition. The figure shows contributions over all six periods in
(A), over the first three out of six periods in (B), and contributions over the
last three out of six periods in (C). Over all periods, the possibility to
perpetrate aggression does not increase cooperative behavior. However, the
possibility to perpetrate aggression does increase cooperative behavior in
the last three periods (t = 1.70, 0.05 < p < 0.1, c.f., Table S2 col. 4).
Moreover, in-group cooperation of victimized participants is also larger than
cooperation of control participants in the last three periods (t = 2.01,
0.05 < p < 0.1, c.f., Table S3 col. 5).
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TABLE 5 | Victimization and cooperative behavior.
Dependent variable: contributions to project A OLS estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Victim 2.333 2.817 5.178 −1.562
(1.781) (1.712) (2.142)** (2.703)
Victim × Period 1.113
(0.539)**
Period −1.885
(0.420)***
Aggression t−1 −0.096
(0.063)
Et (aggression t ) −0.033
(0.105)
Constant 13.295 12.910 12.937 17.459
(1.378)*** (3.772)*** (3.556)*** (3.643)***
Observations 576 480 480 576
R2 0.012 0.106 0.119 0.096
Session dummies No Yes Yes Yes
Period dummies No Yes Yes No
Sample restriction No period> 1 period> 1 No
Standard errors clustered by group in parentheses. ***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
Victim=1 participant in Victimization condition,=0 if Control condition; Aggression= total
contribution of aggressors to projects B and C if participant in Victimization condition, =0
if participant in Control condition.
breaks down in the control condition whereas it remains high in
the aggression condition.
Our third result concerns in-group cooperation among
victimized groups. Figure 3 also discusses how exposure to
aggression affects in-group cooperation among victimized
groups. We observe an increase in cooperation among victimized
individuals, i.e., members of groups experiencing aggression
from others, compared to the control condition. The increase
takes place already in the early periods and the period-trend
is significantly higher among victims than among control
participants (t = 2.06, p = 0.045, see Table 5 col. 4. C.f.
Table S3 in the Supplementary Material), suggesting that in-
group cooperation does not decrease over time among victims as
it does among individuals in the control condition. Interestingly,
cooperation is neither sensitive to the extent of aggression
experienced in the previous round nor to the amount of
aggression victims expect for the current round (see Table 5 col.
3). This result suggests that the mere threat of aggression triggers
a higher level of in-group cooperation among victims.
4. Discussion
This study provides behavioral evidence consistent with the
phenotypic predictions of evolutionary theories of parochial
altruism.
Firstly, a proportion of participants in our experiment exhibit
strong aggression in the absence of any strategic motive. Despite
the fact that any level of desired in-group cooperation is
attainable without perpetrating aggression toward an out-group,
and that aggression does not entail any gains to the individual
nor to her in-group over and above what can be attained
without aggression, some participants do invest part of their
endowment in reducing the payoffs of victimized groups. That is,
participants in the aggression condition contribute a statistically
significant amount of their endowment to anti-social options
(projects B and, to a lesser extent, C) and are aware of the
consequences for the other group. Aggression is not observed
in isolation but combined with in-group cooperation. Participants
readily perpetrate aggression toward a victimized group when
this behavior favors the in-group, even if the strategic incentives
for cooperation are also weak. Second, evolutionary theories
of parochial altruism state that the presence of a type of
behavior that combines in-group cooperation with out-group
aggression is a sufficient condition for evolutionary stability of
in-group altruism (Choi and Bowles, 2007). Consistent with this
hypothesis, we findmore cooperative behavior that remains stable
across periodswhen participants have the possibility to perpetrate
aggression against a victimized group, whereas there is a distinct
drop in public-good contributions in the control condition,
possibly as repeated-game/reputation mechanisms fade in that
condition (Fischbacher and Gachter, 2010). This suggests that
the possibility to exert aggression against an out-group is a more
powerful mechanism to generate cooperation than the strategic
concern to appear pro-social in the standard public goods setting.
Third, we also document that the mere threat of aggression
triggers a higher level of in-group cooperation among victims.
The asymmetric design of our experiment, in which groups
that experience aggression cannot retaliate is key to identify
the effects across victims and perpetrators. In particular, our
results show that both for victims and perpetrators, exposure
to aggression at the group-level increases in-group cooperation
and indicate that the mere presence of aggression, much more
than its extent, triggers higher cooperation. These results contrast
with previous evidence on the deleterious pro-social impact of
exposure to aggression when it occurs at the individual level
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). This moderating effect of group
salience makes clear that the social context in which aggression
takes place is a key factor for understanding the differential
evolutions of large-scale cooperation observed in various post-
conflict and war episodes (Bellows and Miguel, 2009; Blattman
and Miguel, 2010). For example, micro-level studies interested
in the reintegration of child soldiers find contrasted effects of
exposure to civil war on political participation and local collective
action (Humphreys andWeinstein, 2007; Blattman, 2009; Annan
and Blattman, 2010).
Various organizations and institutions try to exploit the
behavioral pattern of parochial altruism by creating a strong
sense of community (as do various human-resource policies or
even military training) and, at the same time, by making salient
the looming threat of competition from other organizations. Our
results suggest that such policies are doubly effective and that
the creation of an outside threat is an effective stabilizer of in-
group cooperation. We believe that this dual phenomenon is at
the root of many genocides and large-scale atrocities that are
perpetrated in the sake of in-group interests—e.g., the infamous
“Radio-Television libre des Mille Collines” that exacerbated the
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Hutu-Tutsi ethnic divide and allowed Hutus to feel justified in
committing murders during the Rwandan genocide.
In our experimental protocol, we neither manipulate the
salience of group identity nor the emotional state of the
participants. We believe that both would be promising avenues
for future research. Indeed we expect that both an increase in
group salience or getting subjects into an aggressive emotional
state could amplify the complementarity between in-group pro-
sociality and out-group anti-sociality; we present a lower bound
to this complementarity.
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